A Look Back at NBA Salaries in 2010: Top Earners and Surprising Figures
I still remember opening the 2010 NBA salary reports with the same anticipation I'd feel before a big playoff game. That season marked a fascinating transition period in league economics, sandwiched between the 2009 financial crisis and the 2011 lockout that would reshape everything. What struck me immediately was how the top of the salary pyramid looked both familiar and startlingly different from today's landscape.
Kobe Bryant's $24.8 million contract with the Lakers stood as the league's highest paycheck that year, and frankly, he earned every cent of it. Coming off back-to-back championships, Kobe was delivering exceptional value at a time when superstar salaries hadn't yet exploded into the $40-50 million range we see today. What's fascinating to me is how team-building philosophies have shifted since then. The second-highest paid player was Rashard Lewis at $20.5 million with Orlando - a capable forward, certainly, but his contract became emblematic of the kind of deals that would soon disappear under the new CBA. I've always argued that 2010 represented the peak of what we might call the "pre-analytics" salary structure, where teams paid premium money for traditional roles rather than advanced impact metrics.
The Celtics had assembled their veteran superteam with Kevin Garnett earning $18.8 million, Paul Pierce at $19.8 million, and Ray Allen making $20 million. Looking back, that Boston model of paying three established stars massive salaries while filling the roster with minimum contracts feels almost quaint compared to today's more balanced approaches. What surprises me most when reviewing these numbers is how relatively modest some future MVPs were playing for. Stephen Curry was in his rookie deal making just $3.1 million with Golden State - a steal that allowed the Warriors to build depth around him. Russell Westbrook earned $4.0 million in Oklahoma City, while James Harden was making barely $4.3 million coming off the bench. The Thunder's ability to develop three future MVPs on cost-controlled contracts represents what I consider the last great small-market advantage before supermax deals changed the calculus entirely.
When we talk about 2010 salaries, we can't ignore the international context that was developing. The NBA's financial structure was increasingly competing with global markets for talent, much like we see in boxing where fighters navigate different promotional landscapes. I'm reminded of Manny Pacquiao's comments about being open to a Floyd Mayweather rematch - "Let's fight again if he wants. I have no problem with that" - which reflects the kind of financial calculations top athletes make across sports. Just as Pacquiao weighed lucrative fights against his legacy, NBA stars in 2010 were beginning to consider international options more seriously. Yao Ming's $18.3 million salary with Houston wasn't just paying for his on-court production but his massive commercial appeal in China. The globalization of basketball economics was accelerating, and the salary structure reflected these emerging markets.
What's particularly striking is how many of the 2010 top earners were big men in an era transitioning toward perimeter dominance. Tim Duncan at $22.2 million, Dirk Nowitzki at $19.8 million, Pau Gasol at $17.8 million - these were the last of the traditional big man mega-contracts before the three-point revolution fully took hold. I've always felt we were witnessing the end of an era without fully realizing it. The league was still paying for post dominance while the future belonged to versatile wings and shooting. The average team salary sat around $70 million, with the luxury tax threshold at $70.3 million - numbers that feel almost nostalgic when you consider today's $136 million cap.
The financial disparities between teams created fascinating competitive dynamics. The New York Knicks, despite being mediocre, carried a $98 million payroll thanks to massive contracts for Eddy Curry ($11.3 million) and Jared Jeffries ($6.9 million) - perfect examples of how desperate franchises overpaid for marginal talent before analytics properly valued production. Meanwhile, small-market success stories like San Antonio ($70 million payroll) and Oklahoma City ($58 million) demonstrated how fiscal discipline could overcome financial disadvantages. I've studied NBA finances for over fifteen years, and 2010 might be the last season where you could find such dramatic differences in team-building philosophies reflected in payroll structures.
Looking back, 2010 represented both the culmination of an old economic model and the beginning of something new. The league was still recovering from the 2008 financial crisis, with some teams tightening spending while others doubled down on star power. What fascinates me is how many general managers saw the coming storm - the lockout was just over the horizon - yet continued operating business as usual. The top-heavy salary structure was becoming unsustainable, with stars commanding increasingly larger shares of team payrolls. Kobe's $24.8 million represented about 35% of the Lakers' total payroll, a percentage that would become standard for superstars but felt revolutionary at the time.
When I compare 2010 to today's NBA economics, I'm struck by how much more sophisticated team building has become. The massive discrepancy between superstar salaries and role player pay created opportunities for smart teams to find value, much like how Pacquiao and Mayweather negotiated their fights based on perceived value and market timing. The financial landscape was about to undergo seismic changes with the 2011 lockout and subsequent TV deals, but in 2010, we were still in this transitional period where old-school contract values coexisted with emerging new realities. The numbers tell a story of a league at the crossroads, unaware that the economic revolution was just around the corner.
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